

## The ‘Modified Multi-Tract’ Model of Peace-Building for Actualization of Sustainable Development in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria

By

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### Abstract

*The Nigeria’s Niger Delta region has since the uprising of Isaac Boro in February 1966 witnessed renewed conflicts. The region, devastated by oil and gas exploitation for over 60 years and the people still prevented from benefiting from the huge revenue, have raised an army from the abandoned youths to disrupt oil and gas facilities, kidnap and hostage taking of oil/gas companies staff. The action is meant to attract positive response from the federal government and multinational oil companies (MNOCs) that are allegedly inducing the conflict. Instead, they (federal government and MNOCs) have resorted to counter-insurgency measures, thereby creating high degree of insecurity and instability in the region and country. The scenario has been compounded by the lack of an appropriate model of peace-building since the Fourth Republic in 1999. Thus, the aim of the paper is to formulate and create public awareness of a modified multi-tract (MMT) model of peace building that would promote good governance to stimulate sustainable development of the region. Accordingly, the study adopted the ‘state-induced violent conflict’ framework propounded by Etekpe (2009b), and applied a combination of ‘participant-observation’ and documentary methods; and found that the ‘MMT’ model is cardinal in promoting security, peace and development (SPD) in the region. The implication of this for public policy is that government has to move away from counter-insurgency and adhoc measures to that of demonstrating political will to engender good governance in the region and country. Thus, the paper recommends that government should implement the UN provision on the Law of the Sea to protect and guarantee the rights of coastal states to sustainable development.*

**Keywords:** Niger Delta region, oil and gas exploitation, conflicts, peace-building, modified multi-tract, sustainable development

### 1. Introduction

On **Background**, the Niger Delta at the time of the pre-independence constitutional conferences in London in 1957, 1958 and 1959 was interpreted to mean the defunct “Western Ijaw (Ijo) Division (in Western Nigeria), and the Rivers Province (in Eastern Nigeria) but excluding Ahoada and Port Harcourt” (Nigeria Year Book, 1959:41 and Willink’s Report, 1958:3-8). The division and province have become the present Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta states in Nigeria. The federal government, however, redefined the region to include Akwa Ibom, Cross River and Edo states at the time of establishing the Oil Minerals Producing and Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 1993. It went further to enlarge it to include the other three oil producing states – Abia, Imo and Ondo states, to make it nine states when it enacted the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) Act, 2000. This invariably means there are two interpretations or definitions of the Niger Delta – historical or environmental comprising Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Cross

River, Edo and Delta (BRACED) states and political, made up of BRACED and Abia, Imo and Ondo (AIO) states. Thus, the political definition of the Niger Delta is now synonymous with oil producing states in the following order of quantum of oil production: Delta, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Rivers, Ondo, Imo, Abia, Edo and Cross River states (Tell, 2008:25) shown in Table 1-1. The study adopted the historical/environmental definition that is consistent with previous studies and scholars (Etekpe 2007: 2-3; HWC Rexit 1958:7-8; Boro 1982:57, 70; and Azaiki 2009:62-130).

**Table 1-1: Oil Production Quota of Political Niger Delta states as at December 2017.**

S/No	States	Quantum of Production
1.	Delta	30.00%
2.	Akwa Ibom	22.00%
3.	Bayelsa	18.20%
4.	Rivers	18.10%
5.	Ondo	7.00%
6.	Imo	2.30%
7.	Abia	1.30%
8.	Edo	1.00%
9.	Cross River	0.10%
	<b>Total</b>	<b>100.00%</b>

**Source:** Adopted from Opukri, C. O. & Etekpe, A. (2008:55) “The Multi-track approach to peace-building in the Niger Delta” *Niger Delta Digest – Monograph Series – Institute for Niger Delta Studies (CNDS)*, Niger Delta University, Bayelsa state, Vol. 1 (October).

The **problem** of the region is traced to the colonial and post-colonial Nigerian governments’ policies of deliberate neglect and under-development, in spite of repeated complaints and/or agitations by the people of the region even before the discovery of crude oil and gas in Oloibiri in the present Bayelsa State on June 4, 1956. In 1956, the people, for example, formed the Rivers Chiefs and Peoples Conference (RCPC) and sent Harold Dappa-Biriye to present the “grievances” of the people, and “demand for a separate Oil Rivers state” for the region (that is now, BRACED state) at the pre-Independence Constitutional Conferences in 1957 and 1958 in London (Dappa-Biriye, 1995:8-15). Harold Dappa-Biriye so brilliantly presented the case that the colonial government set up the Henry Willink’s Commission of Enquire to investigate whether the “grievances and demands” were “true or ill-founded”. Henry Willink and the other members – Messrs Gordon Hadow, Philip Mason and J.B. Shearer came to Nigeria and went round the country, taking testimonies “about the fears of minorities and the means of allaying them in 1957/1958” (Willink’s Report, 1958). According to Dappa-Biriye (1995:10), the leadership of the three majority ethnic groups of Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo persuaded the Commission not to create states for the minorities. Their reason was that the state shall not be economically viable. The commission, however, warned that “no part of the country, especially, Niger Delta be so neglected that the people will take arms and rebel” (1958:72). This warning was not heeded to and the people in the region have rebelled for “the government to order military troops to quell it”, beginning with the Isaac Boro’s uprising in February 1966 (Boro, 1982).

Since then, the human capital indices in the region continued to deteriorate as the Nigerian state urged the MNOCs to increase their activities for the exploration and exploitation of crude oil/gas (Azaiki, 2009: 61-130). In the process, the MNOCs have added another dimension of conflicts – environmental violence in form of environmental degradation, water/air pollution, gas flaring, and disarticulation of the local economy. Unfortunately, while the revenue from oil/gas (Table 1-5) has been the economic mainstay of the country and applied to develop other regions, the Oil Producing Communities (OPCs) have remained ‘poor, backward and neglected’ – where there are no portable water, poor network of roads, and absence of social amenities/ infrastructure, to compensate for it. And whenever the OPCs reacted through peaceful protests against the ‘state/MNOCs –induced’ conflicts, the Nigeria state would direct the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) and/or the armed forces to ‘brutally crack-down, invade and occupy’ the communities as ‘conquered people’. This has been the case in several OPCs, including Umuechem and Ogoni in Rivers state in 1990, Odi in Bayelsa state in 1999 and Gbarain-Ekpetiama Clans in Bayelsa state in 2012 (Etekpe, 2007: 28-30& 2017:7-9).

The people, particularly, the abandoned youths of the federal government/MNOCs then organized themselves into 21 different militant groups and began to disrupt oil/gas facilities and kidnapped staff of MNOCs, as well as, frontally attacked military installations in the region from 2003; and by 2009, they had brought down the production of crude oil from about 2.1million barrels per day (mbpd) to 0.780 (mbpd). This had grave negative consequence on the national revenue that depends on revenue from oil/gas and Musa Yar’Adua, former President of Nigeria (2007-2010) declared amnesty programme (model) to address the conflict. Be that as it may, the model has not resolved the conflicts; instead, it has increased the level of insecurity and instability in the region, in particular, and country, in general, resulting from its haphazard implementation. This has raised three critical **questions**:

- 1) What were the peace-building models applied and their outcomes over the years in the region?
- 2) Why have the models not promoted good governance to stimulate sustainable development?
- 3) How would the ‘MMT’ model be different in stimulating peace for the actualization of sustainable development (SD) in the region?

Thus, the **main aim** of the study was to ‘formulate and create public awareness of the modified multi-track (MMT) model of peace-building to promote good governance for the actualization of sustainable development’ (SD) in the region. The **specific objectives** were:

- a) To examine previous peace-building models and determine how they were inadequate in the actualization of Sustainable Development SD in the region;
- b) To establish a nexus (relationship) between ‘MMT’ model, good governance and SD in the region; and
- c) To recommend the ‘MMT’ model as ideal for peace-building for actualization of SD in the region.

The study adopted the ‘state-induced’ conflict **theoretical framework** propounded by Etekpe (2009b:142-143) – lead author. According to Etekpe, the framework is different from the

prevailing ‘frustration-aggression’ (Dallard, 1939 and Yates, 1962), human needs (Burton, 1990), or systemic (Johnson, 1966:15) social conflict theories because the stimulus of the conflict in the Niger Delta region (NDR) has been the Nigerian state (i.e, repressive policies and obnoxious laws at both colonial and post-colonial eras). He then traced the history of such ‘state-induced’ conflicts to

*The slave trade in 1420, and progressed through economic disarticulation by the Royal Niger Company in 1861, political marginalization in 1914, military invasion/occupation of Umuechem (1990), Ogoni (1990) and Odi (1999) to environmental degradation, resulting from exploitation and exploration of crude oil/gas.... (Etekpe, 2007:28-30).*

As the people protested over the ‘state-induced’ conflicts, the Nigerian state, in collaboration with the MNOCs operating in the region exerted physical and military force on them. This became so pronounced that as earlier stated by 2003 ‘an army of abandoned youths’ from the region emerged to disrupt oil/gas facilities, kidnapped and took on hostage staff of MNOCs, and brought down oil production from about 2.1million barrels per day (mbpd) to 0.780mbpd (Okolo and Etekpe, 2010:20-30 and Ekpu, 2007:111). In reaction, the federal government resorted to counter-insurgency model of peace-building, and later proclaimed an ‘amnesty programme’ in 2009 (Etekpe, 2012:286-294). As both models (strategies) were inadequate to resolve the conflicts, the situation in the region has metamorphosed into ‘strategic militancy’.

It has been observed that several scholars, practitioners and organizations have increasingly adopted the framework in analyzing the crisis of development and underdevelopment, insecurity and instability, and related issues of the region because of its relevance (Azaiki, 2009:61-137; SSPA, 2014:3-5; Ganagana, 2016; and Nnana, 2017:81-91).

The framework is relevant to the study as the ‘MMT’ model brought together state and non-state actors (i.e., federal and state government officials, and MNOCs), representatives of host communities, and other stakeholders for constructive dialogue/engagement under an experienced facilitator. (i.e. peace-builder). The model afforded the principal parties and other stakeholders to the conflict the opportunity to express and/or articulate their grievances or positions, (i.e., problems) through effective communication by interfacing with their publics, chart strategies for collaboration and negotiation, and pursue the other phases in the model in Table 1-8(a). The utmost goal of the model is to achieve reconciliation for actualization of SD. As the arrows in the Table 1-8 show, the process goes back and forth until the reconciliation phase was achieved; even at that, the feedback system continued in order to forestall breakdown.

The theory assumes that the NDR, in particular, and Nigeria, in general cannot always be at peace or harmony devoid of conflicts. This, the Nigerian state has to recognize that inspite of the seemingly present peaceful or harmonious condition in the region, there are inherent contradictions resulting from ‘state-induced’ conflicts. It is probably for this reason, Harold Dappa-Biriye, patriarch of the Niger Delta and champion of minority rights, propounded “the interactive approach to conflict resolution” where he stated that,

*...society is not a graveyard that should be quiet at all times and as such, there should be a minimal level of conflict within a group to galvanize parties in conflict to re-examine their position. The re-examination is expected to promote interaction (Etekpe, 2007:27).*

The basic **method** of data collection was “case study” (Bailey, 1982:325), with emphasis on the ‘Ogoni peace process (OPP)’ between 1997 and 2003. The case study was on how General Yakubu Gowon, former head of state and government (HOSG) (1966-1975), under the auspice of Yakubu Gowon Institute (YGC), brought the: 1) two factions of Ogoni people, 2) SPDC, 3) federal (including Rivers state) government, and 4) other stakeholders, to pursue a 4-phase ‘multi-track (MT)’ peace-building model (Table 1-7) that engendered peace in the kingdom (incidentally, the lead author was a key driver of the model) (YGC, 2003). The ‘MT’ model was, however, inadequate to resolve the conflict as it did not progress to the final phase of reconciliation. This necessitated the need to formulate the ‘modified multi-track’ (MMT) model and that has been successfully tested in several communities in the region.

It was **complemented** by ‘**participant-observation**’ method. The authors are social activists in the region and have developed data-base on the subject matter over the years. The lead author has, for example, participated in evolving several reports of the federal government on the Niger Delta (discussed in Section 2(3), S/No. 6,7,10,14,15,18, and 21). The method was enhanced by **documentary study** where we assessed historical records, including federal government gazettes, White papers, and the reports outlined at Section 2(3).

In addition, we held 15 **focused group** discussions (FGDs) in the following carefully selected oil producing communities (OPCs) and states that were prone to oil/gas related violent conflicts in the region (Table 1-2), between March and October 2017. The selection was based on ‘purposive sampling’ technique as the authors are activists in the region.

**Table1-2: Selected Oil Producing Communities (OPCs) for Focused Group Discussions(FGDs) in the Niger Delta Region, 2017.**

S/No.	State	OPCs	No. FGD	Target Population for FGDs
1.	Bayelsa	Ikarama-Okordia	1	1. Traditional Ruler 2. Chairman/Secretary of CDC 3. Chairman/Secretary of YA 4. Academia (5) 5. Chairman/Secretary of WG 6. Chairman/Secretary of MMW 7. Selected militant Camp Leaders (5) 8. Government Officials (5) 9. MNOCs staff (5)
		Oporoma	1	
		Nembe	1	
2.	Rivers	Edegeri	1	
		Etche	1	
3.	Delta	Burutu	1	
		Obiaruku (Abraka)	1	
		Ogbe-Ijoh	1	
4.	Akwa-Ibom	Ibeno	1	
		Obolo	1	
		Eket	1	
5.	Edo	Gbaramatu	1	
		Egelegele	1	
6.	-	Federal Government Officials (5)	1	
7.	-	Staff –MNOCs (5)	1	
<b>TOTAL</b>			<b>15</b>	

**Source:** Authors compilation, 2017.

**Key:** CDC -Community Development Committee; YA -Youth Association; WG-Women Group; MMW - Market Men and Women

It has been observed that the methods were very popular within sociology; and Max Weber and Emile Durkheim also applied them. At this point, we wish to **clarify** some of the **concepts** applied in this study, beginning with conflict.

- 1) **Conflict.** The term, conflict is a Latin word which refers to as ‘clash’, ‘fight’ or ‘confrontation’ among disputant parties where the ‘means’ or ‘ends’ are incompatible. Conflict management, on the other hand, is when ‘interventionist’ efforts (are made) towards preventing the escalation and negative effects, especially, violent one (Etekpe, 2010). According to Miller, (2003:7), conflicts could be reduced, down-graded, contained or coped with, especially since conflicts are hardly completely resolved. In NDR, conflict has not been contained, but merely reduced or down-graded. “This”, as Elaigwu stated (1997:93) “means that conflict management, resolution and peace-building in a state as Nigeria (and the NDR) is a continued process”, and as discussed later in Section 2(3), it has taken the federal government 21 different peace-building models to resolve it.
- 2) **Peace-building.** This is referred to as the application of different models tilted towards bringing about enduring peace, and it involves 5 phases, namely: *peace-making, peace-building, peace-keeping, peace-enforcement, and multi-track diplomacy*. The concept of peace-building is the most popular one among them and often times, including this study, is

used to embrace the entire phases. In this study, the phases are incorporated into the 'arbitration' process of the MMT model in Table 1-8a.

- 3) **Resource control and management.** This is where the states in the region and those in other regions of the country should re-gain their right to own, control and manage the natural and mineral resources found in their territory and pay an agreed statutory percentage (i.e; 50 percent) to the central pool controlled by the federal government for execution of general services. It was the case in the First Republic, 1960-1966. This concept forms the crux of the fiscal federalism the country is supposedly practicing. The concept is re-visited because it has been frustrated by the military governments between 1966-1979 and 1983-1999; and unfortunately, the Fourth Republic has continued with it.
- 4) **Good governance.** Within the context of the study, it is referred to as the political executives (i.e; president, state governors, members of state and federal parliaments, and local government chairmen) making concerted efforts to elicit citizens participation in the governance processes of the state and/or country in order to engender sustainable development. It also implies accountability, transparency, enforcement of fundamental human rights, equity, and inclusiveness in governance. We have in Table 1-8b outlined the components (constituents) of good governance, and how promoting them shall stimulate the actualization of SD (Table 1-8c).
- 5) **Sustainable Development (SD).** This is where the activities of the present development paradigm be executed in such a friendly/conscious manner that its effects would not adversely affect the prospect of future generations from actualizing their own SD. Thus, the emphasis here is on responsive provision of social and critical infrastructures, building human capital, and strengthening economic and political institutions, etc., (Table 1-8c).

The paper is divided into **four sections**, beginning with this introduction. It is followed by review of relevant literature, especially on peace-building models of the federal government; data presentation and discussion; and concluding remarks/recommendations.

## 2. Literature Review:

### 2.1. Development Paradigms:

The Henry Willink's Commission report (HWCR) described the region as "poor, backward and neglected", and recommended the establishment of an economic development agency in line with the other 9 deltas of the world (Table 1- 4). Dappa-Biriye, however, argued against the "economic development" paradigm and advocated for a "political development" paradigm by creating separate states for the people (Dappa-Biriye, 1995:15). To him, the states shall become platforms or centers of development. Being misunderstood, his approach was discarded, and the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDDB) was then established in 1961 to develop the region within 10 years. Unfortunately, NDDDB could not develop the region because of inherent structural, administrative and funding problems (as envisaged by Dappa-Biriye). Instead of revamping NDDDB, the Olusegun Obasanjo's military government (1976-1979), created additional eleven river basins and rural development authorities (RBRDAs) in different parts of the country even where there were no rivers in 1978. The government then funded the new eleven RBRDAs more

than the Niger Delta basin development authority. This was, as stated in Willink's Commission report, a negation; and the policy itself failed. Thus, by 1993, the eleven RBRDAs had literally collapsed.

This spurred another round of protest by the people (OPCs) as the region has by this time become the economic live-wire of the country. The Shehu Shagari's civil government in the Second Republic (1979-1983) then decided to pay 1.5 percent derivation to oil producing areas and established a Presidential Task Force to administer the fund. As this amount was inadequate, the level of restiveness in the region intensified, and former military President Ibrahim B. Babaginda (IBB) (1985-1993) raised it to 3 percent and set up OMPADEC to administer it in 1993. OMPADEC equally failed, and former president Olusegun Obasanjo's civil government (1999-2007) in the Fourth Republic once again, established the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000 to address the crisis of development and under-development in the region. NDDC, too, has failed as development paradigm due mainly to federal governments' lack of political will to fund the NDDC (Table 1-3). The Table 1-3 is clear that in spite of the small amount of allocation, barely an average of 46 percent of the amount per year were actually released. The amount is insignificant, compared with the revenue from the region in Table 1- 5, to develop the region.

**Table 1-3: Federal Government Budgetary Release to NDDC (₦000,000).**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Budget Allocation</b>	<b>Actual Releases</b>	<b>% short fall</b>
2010	240,553	106,221	44%
2011	261,037	119,340	45%
2012	250,800	136,141	55%
2013	315,800	176,848	56%
2014	456,210	196,170	43%
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,524,400</b>	<b>734,720</b>	<b>48%</b>

**Source:** Federal Ministry of Finance, Abuja, Nigeria 2015

This, as Etekpe (2009a) and Azaiki (2009) pointed out, were not how the other deltas presented in Table 1- 4 are treated. The Mekong and Mississippi deltas in China and USA, for example, are so developed by their countries and promoted to global standard that they now form part of the development ledger of the United Nations (UN).

**Table 1- 4: Major Deltas of the World.**

S/No	Name of Delta	Location	Oil producing (Yes), not oil producing (No)	Size
1.	Mekong Delta	China - Asia	Yes	49,520 square kilometers
2.	Mississippi Delta	United States of America	Yes	3,705 square kilometers
3.	Niger Delta	Nigeria - Africa	Yes	70,000 square kilometers
4.	Nile Delta	Egypt - Africa	Yes	3,349,000 square kilometers
5.	Yangtze Delta	China - Asia	No	Not available
6.	Pearl Delta	China - Asia	No	Not available
7.	Okavango Delta	Angola - Africa	Yes	16,000 square kilometers
8.	Orinoco Delta	Venezuela - South America	Yes	2,140 square kilometers
9.	Mahakam Delta	Indonesia –Asia	Yes	Not available
10.	Mackenzie Delta	Canada - North America	Yes	1,738 square kilometers

*Source: Etekpe, A (2009a:1) Policy Option and Adaptation: A Comparative study of the Niger Delta and other Deltas of the world” Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, Monograph series No.003*

The Table 1- 4 shows that aside the Niger Delta, there are 9 other deltas of the world and is clear that some deltas (i.e, S/No. 1,2,4,5 and 10) are not in the tropics, while other deltas (i.e, S/No. 5&6) do not produce crude oil and gas. What is common to them is that they all possess the distinctive characteristics (generics) of delta as earlier highlighted (Etekpe, 2009a:1-2).

It should be noted that most people in the region have considered NDDC as another failure, and as such intensified the conflict. One of the fresh cardinal demands of the youths is for economic and political restructuring of the country. Thus, the current development paradigm is tilted towards restructuring where the 68 items on the exclusive legislative list shall be reduced to 34, the concurrent legislative list shall be increased from the present 34 to 53, as well as, increment of the residual legislative list from 0 to 24 (Etekpe, et al, 2017:14). The crux of the argument is that the unwieldy exclusive legislative list has given the presidency undue powers to violate the rights of the federating units and induce conflicts, especially in NDR.

## **2.2.The Crisis of ‘development and under-development’ in the Niger Delta**

The literature on the subject matter emphasized that the people of the region were actively involved in several economic activities, such as, crop farming, fishing, and trading in palm oil and kernels in the pre-colonial and colonial eras. The Chiefs in the region even entered into “treaties of friendship and protection” with Her Majesty’s Government in Britain in the 1860s. But when the Nigerian state became incorporated into the Western capitalist system, the local economies of the people of the region were disarticulated. This became worst with the discovery of crude oil and gas in Oloibiri in the present Bayelsa state on June 4, 1956. By 2009, the oil and gas industry has

polluted the creeks and rivers, and degraded the environment to the point that the people lost their traditional means of livelihood (Okaba, 2008:39-49). Paradoxically, while suffering from the loss of means of production caused by the state-induced conflicts (i.e, federal government), the people were (and still) prevented from benefitting from the oil/gas industry by the federal government's repressive policies, and obnoxious laws and decrees. The policies and laws account for the crisis of development and under-development in the region. In Table 1-5, we have tabulated the contributions of the region to the revenue profile of Nigeria by comparing and contrasting oil and non-oil revenue between 2012 and 2017.

**Table 1- 5: Schedule of Oil and Non-Oil Revenue (₦ 000,000) as at December 2017**

Description/ Year	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Oil Revenue	3,191,900	5,396,100	8,879,100	8,025,953	8,240,545	8,950,445
Non-Oil Revenue	1,652,700	1,907,600	2,237,900	2,628,771	2,740,601	2,830,241
Total Revenue	4,844,600	7,303,700	11,303,900	10,654,725	10,981,146	11,780,685
% of Oil Revenue	66%	74%	80%	75.4%	75%	76%

**Source:** Federation Accounts Allocation Committee (FAAC), Abuja, 2017

It should be further emphasized that the major non-oil revenue accruing to the federation is Value Added Tax (VAT); and it is generated mainly by Lagos and Rivers states (SSPA report, 2014:23, and Intelligence reports, 2017). This shows that the bulk of revenue for Nigeria is sourced from southern Nigeria where the region is located.

We wish to recall that the basis of the Nigerian colonial and post-colonial political economy is 'uneven economic' development (Table 1-5). Thus, in Nigeria, those who have access to central political power made it possible for an unhindered shifting of resources from the Niger Delta to develop their swamps and deserts areas as the case of Lagos and Abuja (that are outside the region). The development of these and similar areas did not pass through commissions like NDDB, OMPADEC, or NDDC. They had line allocation from the federation account.

In commenting on "post-civil war crises of development of the region", Tedheke, (in Yakubu et al, 2005:441) posits that it "has been the crises of fiscal federalism, the minority question, deconstructing federalism, (state-induced terrorism), and internal colonialism. He went further to argue that the reluctance of the federal government to adequately address these crises has brought about the politics of every ethnic group to itself. Thus, the people of Niger Delta believe that since the federal government, controlled by the three majority ethnic groups would not want to adhere to the principle of fiscal federalism that is considered to address the crisis of development and under-development of the region, 'the change has to come through violence' (Fanon, 1952 and Azaiki 2009). In order words, the Nigerian state through the structure, operation and power configuration, has induced conflict and is responsible for the unprecedented ethnic militias and 'rebel' movements in the Niger Delta (Table 1-6).

Incidentally, the phenomenon of ethnic militancy or micro-nationalism movements has spread from the time of Isaac Boro's uprising on 23 February 1966 to the rest of the country in Nigeria (Onimajesinm, in Yakubu et al, 2005:578). The prominent ones, include: O'odua people congress

(OPC), Arewa youth congress (AYC), Igbo people congress (IPC), Bakassi boys (BB), the movement for actualization of the sovereign state of Biafra (MASSOB) and Boko Haram in North-East (Table 1-6). These movements, operating in different regions of the country, have increased the level of insecurity and instability in Nigeria.

**Table 1- 6: Major Micro-Nationalism Movements in Nigeria as at 2017**

S/N	Name	Year	Affiliation
1.	Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB)	1992	Igbo ethnic groups of South Eastern states
2.	Bakassi Boys (BB)	1993	Vigilante in Abia and Anambra states in Eastern states
3.	O’odual Peoples’ Congress (OPC)	1994	Afenifere - Pan Yoruba group of Western states
4.	Arewa Youth Congress (AYC)	1995	Arewa Peoples’ Congress (APC) of Hausa/Fulani group in Northern states
5.	Igbo Peoples’ Congress (IPC)	1999	Ohanaeze - Pan Igbo socio-cultural organization in Eastern states
6.	Boko Haram (BH) Jama’atuAhlusSunnah LidDa’awaituual Jihadist	2009	Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Yobe, Adamawa and Borno (YAB) states in North-Eastern states

**Source:** Authors Fieldwork, 2017

At this point, let us examine the models of the federal government in resolving the foregoing conflicts in the country.

### 2.3.Federal government’s peace-building models.

The federal government has ‘seemingly’ addressed the Niger Delta crisis through the following 21 peace-building models. The models were in form of case study, fact-finding, Adhoc task forces, conferences, etc, between 1961 and 2014. They were:

- 1) Niger Delta Development Board (NDDC), 1961
- 2) Presidential Task Force (1.5%) Committee on Derivation), 1980.
- 3) The Belgore Report, 1992
- 4) Oil Mineral Producing Development Commission (OMPADEC), 1993.
- 5) The Etiebet (Inter-Ministerial Fact finding Team (IMFFT) Report, 1994
- 6) Niger Delta Environmental Survey Group (NDESG), 1996
- 7) The Vision 2010 Report, 27 September 1996
- 8) The Popoola Report, 1996
- 9) Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights situation in Nigeria, 1997
- 10) The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), 2000
- 11) The Ogomudia Report, 2001
- 12) White Paper Report of the Presidential panel on National Security, 2003
- 13) Report on First International Conference on sustainable Development of Niger Delta, 2003
- 14) The Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan (NDRDMP), 2004
- 15) The National Political Reform Conference (NPRC) Report, 2005
- 16) UNDP: Niger Delta Human Development Report (UNHDR), 2006

- 17) Report of the Presidential Council on the Social and Economic Development of the Coastal States of the Niger Delta (PCSEDCS), 2006
- 18) The Technical Committee on Niger Delta (TCND), 2008
- 19) Federal Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA), 2008
- 20) Amnesty Programme, 2009
- 21) National Conference, 2014

In addition to the foregoing 21 models, the Nigerian state has applied 5 broad principles/models in peace-building in the region, namely: creation of states and local government areas (LGAs), spread of appointments/ employments, adhoc structures, military intervention, and judicial process (Etekpe, 2007: 192-196). Now, let's briefly discuss each of them.

We have earlier discussed (Section 2 (i)) how Harold Dappa-Biriye persuaded the British government to adopt the political, instead of perceived economic, development paradigm, and how the inability of the economic interventionist agencies to develop the region. As an approach, (model) to forestall perennial agitation, the federal government created states and LGAs, starting with 12 in 1967 to 36 and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) in 1996; out of this number, the region has 6 states and 121 LGAs. Whereas the creation of states and LGAs has doused tension, the exercises were not carefully planned by the federal government, and accordingly failed to create the desired impact. Thus, creation of states and LGAs has equally become a prominent source and causes of conflict in the region and country.

The second was the application of the federal character model for appointments and employment of persons between levels 01 and 07 meant for the catchment areas/states while those of levels 08 – 17 should spread evenly among the federating units. This has to a large extent reduced the fear that only people from the majority ethnic nationalities were monopolizing appointments/ positions in the federal civil/public service.

The third is the establishment of adhoc structures over the years to handle intra-inter-ethnic and institutional conflicts, especially the National Boundary Adjustment Commission. The Commission usually meet periodically to address issues of boundary dispute.

The fourth model is the government resorting to military option where NPF and the army directly intervene in 'conquering' OPCs. As previously stated, this was the case of Ogoni (1990), Umuechem (1990), Odi (1999), and Odioma (2005) in the region. Accordingly, it has set up a special unit of the armed forces – Joint Military Task Force (JTF), to apply maximum military force against the people for the slightest restiveness in the region.

The fifth model is the judicial model where the federal government usually constitutes Judicial Commission or Panel to unravel the remote or immediate sources and causes of conflict, and make recommendations to forestall it. It is unfortunate that such reports are hardly read or recommendations implemented.

In assessing these and similar federal government's models of peace-building in the region, E. J. Alagoa (2003:10-11), a renowned historian and international scholar, wrote:

*If we consider our present government practices, we may discover that we have not done enough to manage conflicts, thus creating opportunities for conflicts to escalate to the point where we have to take fire-brigade action to resolve them,*

*and because the action was not thorough, conflicts that are seemingly resolved later resurfaced....*

It is a known fact that the 21 models along with the 5 principles have not resolved conflicts in the region, and engendered peace due mainly to lack of government's political will, insincerity of the state-actors, non-involvement of the 'real' stakeholders in the region, and inadequacy of the models. This was the crux of Jude Tabai's argument presented by Ganagana, (2016:7). Tabai, allegedly (godfather of militants in the Niger Delta) was not happy with the federal government model and team handling the Niger Delta crisis for not involving the 'real' stakeholders. For him, the team members were basically 'spreading falsehood about the NDR in Abuja, and he decided to take the then Minister of State for Petroleum (Dr. Edmund Dakoru) to meet the real stakeholders and places in Kurutie, Okerenkoko, Oporoza and other cluster communities in the region to know the particular sources where the crises ignited. He told the Minister not to publicize the meeting:

*so we agreed and left, he (Minister) said somebody was going to join us and I asked who? He was the general manager (GM) security, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC); I said, this same GM, I had been advising him for over five months and refused to listen to me. And when I saw him I knew, the man had a different agenda from my own agenda because about five minutes later State Security Service (SSS) officers took me in when he came into the office... (this is how the mission could not achieve its purpose of charting a peace-building mechanism in the region) (Ganagana, 2016:7).*

The foregoing discussion shows that the federal government prefers adhoc and fire-brigade models by setting up agencies, institutions and/or committees to prepare reports that were hardly studied and recommendations implemented. This is where good governance comes in.

#### **2.4. Good governance.**

Generally, good governance is referred to:

- a) Citizens participation in the socio-economic and political development programmes;
- b) Adherence to the rule of law; and
- c) Credible electoral process.

The essence of good governance is to promote:

- (i) Enduring peace to stimulate SD;
- (ii) Strengthening socio-economic and political institutions; and
- (iii) Provision of social/critical infrastructures.

It has been observed that due to the faulty leadership recruitment process in the region and country, the Nigerian state has not produced dynamic and proactive national or regional leaders with the capacity to pursue good governance, especially in the Fourth Republic. Accordingly, the characteristics and essence of good governance discussed here and in Table 1-8b are absent in the system. This was the crux of Etekpe's (2014) Keynote Address delivered on **Boro Day symposium** in Bayelsa state in 2014 where he pointed out that:

*... while development might have been slow in the region because of the small amount of money in the first period (2000-2010), the second period (2011 -*

*2013) and beyond had 'huge' amount of money from the federal allocation for programmes/projects to make positive impact. But the opposite is the case in the Niger Deltaregion. This shows that the quantity of money accruing to the region has not simultaneously translated into the desired level of development to curb violent conflicts. When probed further, the main factors responsible for it is poor governance resulting from ineffective leadership. As young men and women, the time has come to re-direct the struggle inwards – interrogating how the state governments are applying our resources to promote good governance (for the actualization of sustainable development).*

The message was that the political executives would not want to promote good governance, thus, he urged the citizens (youths and women) to demand it as a fundamental right. Femi Adelegan (2016:17) seems to express the position when he wrote, “the ordinary citizens would not bother about who governs (any of) the states in the region or country if such political executives have pursued good governance” and because they have deliberately refused to pursue it, the people should demand it. He went further to outline 7 different ways MMT model would promote good governance to stimulate peace for the actualization of SD in the region. They are:

- 1) Running an efficient and dynamic administration that provides basic social services. If these social services work well in the other 9 deltas, Europe and Americas, it is because the political executives there are pursuing good governance;
- 2) Diversification of the economy through prudent management and accountability to the citizenry. Diversification will regenerate vital subsectors, such as agriculture, social infrastructure, housing, power and tourism;
- 3) Strict adherence to the public procurement Act, 2012, to promote efficiency and transparency in the award and execution of contracts;
- 4) Responsiveness to the needs and aspirations of the citizenry – curtailing waste through flashy convoys, over bloated political appointments, reduction of security votes of governors that presently ranges between N0.5 billion and N0.7 billion and LGA chairmen of between N0.3 billion and 0.02 billion per month.
- 5) Reducing cost of governance in order to reduce poverty and instilling financial discipline. Here, we call for presidential directive on low profile culture of state governors, legislators, ministers and state/national assembly members, and political parties executives;
- 6) Consistency in public policy formulation and implementation, and periodic reforms for state and national political office holders on fiscal discipline; and
- 7) Education to be regarded as the greatest investment for government at all levels as it is the foundation of peace, security and sustainable development in the region and country.

The foregoing discussion stressed the nexus between MMT model and good governance in promoting peace for the actualization of SD in the region.

### **2.5. An Alternative Development Policy.**

Okigbo (1993:280-282), Ekuereh (2008:6-8), Azaiki, (2009:63-100) and associates have charted an ‘alternative development model’ for actualization of SD in the region. They argue that

instead of blaming on inappropriate models of peace-building over the years and the ‘evil’ alliance between government and MNOCs, etc, the main issue for consideration is the inability of the political executives to “accelerate and restructure the economy along the path of self-reliant, people-instituted, integrated and poverty alleviating development”. They, believe that the alternative development policy (model) shall stimulate:

- (a) Production oriented (as against the present consumption-based) economy where the emphasis shall be on small-medium-manufacturing enterprises (SMMEs), information technology for employment generation and sustained rise in productivity;
- (b) Agriculture and agro-allied industries where the emphasis shall be on widening and exploiting economic linkages between agricultural and non-agricultural sectors as basis for rapid and integrated economic growth and development;
- (c) Planned transition from mono-product (oil/gas) to a multi-product-based agricultural export structure to pursue processing in domestic agro-allied industries. Here, the emphasis shall be on development of rural infrastructure – extension services, farmers’ education, road, water and electricity to boost productivity; and
- (d) Full integration of oil exploitation with manufacturing production processes since the region is endowed with raw materials resources for petro-chemical industry to employ the ‘abandoned youths’. With the integration, a large proportion of the materials used for production in the petroleum sector or even the rigs used in the exploration should not, as in Malaysia, Brazil and Venezuela, be produced outside the region.

The proponents urged government, MNOCs and OPCs not to invest too much on peace-building; instead, they should intensify efforts on the realization of the above four oil/gas-based industrialization policy that would, in turn, engender SD. They emphasized that where the industrialization takes-off, there is the tendency that the youths would be gainfully employed, poverty reduced to the barest minimum, and the quality of life improved, and conflicts shall no longer be fashionable. By this, peace shall become a natural consequence for SD. The adherents drew their analysis from other developing countries, especially, Malaysia, Brazil, Egypt, South Korea and Venezuela, and concluded that:

*the greatest challenge confronting the Niger Delta and Nigerian economy in the new millennium is how to greatly raise the proportion of the gross domestic product (GDP) dedicated to the development of the knowledge industry in all its ramifications (and not so much on peace models) (Ekuerehare, 2008:8).*

### **3. Data Presentation, Discussion and Results**

#### **3.1. Data Presentation**

We have presented here a synthesis of the different inputs from the focused group discussions (FGDs) in Table 1-2, and historical records. The FGDs (except government/MNOCs) were unanimous that the federal government/MNOCs induced violent conflicts in the region by their failure to establish the link between exploration/exploitation of oil/gas and SD. They are angered that the wealth from oil/gas has not brought about positive impact in the region, whereas it is applied to develop other areas, including, Lagos, Kaduna, Abuja and Minna, etc, thereby fitting

into Ehwarieme's (2011:1-2) analysis that: "in the case of Nigeria, especially, her oil-rich Niger Delta region, the affluence from oil/gas has resulted in 'affliction' or under-development". This is contrary to what happens in a number of other oil/gas producing countries (Table 1-4) which have experienced significant development through oil/gas.

The academia and CDCs, in particular, emphasized that given the infinite and non-renewable nature of the resources, especially, the search for an alternative sources of energy (aside oil), the federal government should have by now (i.e, 1956 - 2017) developed the region the way China and USA developed their Mekong and Mississippi deltas. The concern is that by the time the proven oil reserves of 37.2billion barrels (bb), as well as, an estimated 159trillion cubits feet (tcf)of gas as at 2011 have dried up, the region shall become desolate, and the harmful effects of oil/gas industries, i.e; environmental degradation, water/oil pollution, disarticulation of local economy, etc, shall continue for a long time in the region (Okaba,2008:41- 44 and Etekpe, 2012).

It is against this background that militancy emerged from 2003 to respond to government/MNOCs-induced conflicts through disruption of oil/gas facilities and frontally attacking the JTF installations in the region. The militants asserted that they reacted against federal government-induced conflicts because of government's policy of deliberate under-development of the region in spite of the warning by Henry Willink's Commission (1958). Incidentally, their position is popular amongst the OPCs because even though they believe that 'conflict is an enemy of SD', the fear that the federal government/MNOCs shall abandon the region at post-oil/gas era enthused them to hold on to the option of militancy.

The data pointed out that conflict by the government and the people of the region have been dominated by concerns over environmental degradation, etc. associated with the oil industry and how more of the revenue from it should be applied to develop the region. According to Ehwarieme (2012:2):

*the people are demanding for increase from an outright control...to between 25 and 50 percent or for an outright control of their resources in an arrangement which they would pay taxes to the federal government. These demands are not made not only because so much is needed for environmental remedy and development of infrastructure in the swampy terrain, but also because the derivative principle was up to 50 percent in the 1950s and 1960s when the bulk of government revenue was from cash crops produced by the majority ethnic groups.*

Nnana (2017:86-91) went further to assert that the drastic reduction of the derivative principle is an expression of oppression, domination and marginalization by the federal government. This became so prominent that since 1999 (i.e; Fourth Republic), it has been 'conflict continues'.

The government/MNOCs have different perspective. They submitted that despite the reduction in derivative principle, the amount of money accrued to the region, especially, Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa-Ibom and Delta (BRAD) states have been significant enough to attract envy of other regions. They argued that much of this has not been applied transparently to produce critical infrastructure and non-oil industrial sectors by the indigenous political executives of the states. Thus, the main cause of conflicts was not the federal government and MNOCs but 'lack of good

governance by the indigenous political executives' (i.e; governors, elected state and federal parliamentarians, political appointees, etc.). Going forward, they pointed at the different aspects of corporate social responsibility (CSR) of MNOCs, especially SPDC that directly benefited the host communities. Experience has shown that, indeed, in several OPCs, the MNOCs have filled the spaces of the local, state and federal governments.

The data also shows that Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) – an umbrella organization of youths in Ijaw nation, covering 6 states in the region at the present structural arrangement does not have the capacity to uncover gradual buildup of crisis that would culminate into violent conflicts. This is because the FGD unraveled that some of the founding fathers of IYC, especially Chief T.K. Ogoriba and Hon. Duo Kalsuo, argued that the initial concept of the organizational structure was that the leaders of all the recognized militant youth organizations in the region would form the Executive Committee. Members of the Committee would then elect their leaders – President, Secretary, etc. By this arrangement, the leadership shall control the activities of the youth/militant organizations. Unfortunately, at the pre-constitution of the Executive Council in the evening of December 10, 1998 at Kaiama town, venue of the IYC conference, some delegates nurtured the concept of open election in an effort to 'curb' the rising profile of Chief Ogoriba and Duo Kalsuo from becoming the President and Secretary respectively. Thus, on December 11, 1998, there was an election where several leaders who had no organization to control emerged as the executives. That singular mistake had made IYC executives unable to define proper model for the organization to chart peace-building processes.

Furthermore, the data was clear that the federal government's model of managing conflicts and peace-building in the region have largely been based on fire-brigade approach of reacting to violent eruptions of oil/gas facilities. This has often led to **stop-gap** and **ad hoc** models that do not bring about enduring peace to stimulate SD.

### 3.2. Discussion.

Peace-building has become very complex and sophisticated, and the case of Ogoni peace process (OPP) (1997-2003) discussed here offers a lot of valuable lessons for charting the new model – modified multi-track (MMT) models for actualization of SD in the region. Incidentally, as discussed later, the 'MMT' model has been tested successfully in several communities in the region.

To recall, crude oil/gas was discovered in Bomu and Korokoro-Tai in Ogoniland by SPDC in 1959 and 1966, and later spread to other towns in the land. By 1990, the total value of crude oil lifted from Ogoniland was US\$40billion, and at the same time, there was virtually no social infrastructures, potable water, networks of road, etc. to compensate for it (Etekpe, 2007:168-171). Thus, the people protested peacefully and thereafter articulated their demands as Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR) and presented it to the federal government and MNOCs, especially SPDC, and formed the Movement of Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) as a platform to implement the tenets of OBR in 1990.

In the process of implementation, several models emerged, leading to factionalization and an eventual death of: first, Ogoni 4, and later, Ogoni 9, totaling 13 prominent first generation elites of Ogoniland. This brought sharp factions that degenerated to intra-crisis in Ogoniland and several experts and organizations resolved to build peace among the following 3 principal actors: 1) 2

factions of Ogoni people, 2) MNOCs, especially SPDC, and 3) federal (and Rivers state) government but failed. At this point Ogoniland was a pariah state for 3 years and General Dr. Yakubu Gowon, former HOSG, 1966-1975, under the auspice of Yakubu Gowon Institute (YGC) got the consent of the principal actors to the conflict and applied the 'multi-track' (MT) model in Table 1-7 to build peace. It was known as **Ogoni Peace Process (OPP)**. The 'MT' model was anchored by the lead author and facilitated by General Dr. Yakubu Gowon between 1997 and 2003.

**(a) The Multi-Track (MT) Model of Peace-Building.**

The MT model brought together the 3 principal disputants or actors, along with the YGC peace-building team and was facilitated by General Dr. Gowon. He was supported by Harold Dappa-Biriye, patriarch of the Niger Delta and treaty mandatory, and Ambassador MB Ekpang (Deputy Chief Executive, YGC) (YGC, 2003:5-8), and went through the following tracts in Table 1-7.

(i) The model had 4 tracks (Table 1-7), beginning with **effective communication**. This phase was crucial because many conflicts can be resolved by proper communication with and amongst the principal actors and/or stakeholders. The beginning of the **communication** was to have access to OBR, studied it, identified the signatories and the problems, met with each of them that were alive, and persuaded them to participate in the peace-building process in early 1997. The OBR was signed by all the then first class traditional rulers and opinion leaders of the 126 towns and villages in Ogoniland, totaling 30 signatories. We equally met and interacted with the following cluster groups:

- Officials of Rivers state and federal governments;
- Officials of MNOCs, especially SPDC;
- Members of MOSOP, especially the Secretary-General and President;
- Political class, youth organizations, women groups religious groups; and
- Public opinion leaders within and outside Ogoniland and Rivers state.

(ii) The track progressed to that of **collaboration** where the facilitator conveyed the first public meeting and was attended by 73 Ogoni leaders and the other actors/ stakeholders at the Port Harcourt City Hall on 08 August, 1997. The essence of the track was for parties to work together to resolve the conflict through constructive dialogue. The central focus was on making and building peace for actualization of SD by looking beyond the crisis. This was the first time Ogoni people had gathered in this large number to discuss the crisis with the alleged 'inducers' since it started in 1994. It was amazing to have seen people who had vowed not to see each other, especially SPDC team, began to talk and discuss with each other in a relaxed atmosphere. As the track was focused on the issues, it enhanced the search for common ground for a consensus peace document (i.e, reconciliation).


(iii) At the **mediation** track, the demands and the different positions of the disputants, especially, MOSOP and the youths, on one hand, and SPDC, on the other hand, were duly considered. The Ogoni people, for example, restated their demands for creation of Ogoni state, creation of additional LGAs beyond the present 5, reduction of the number of stop-and-search points of internal security forces and their physical presence, federal appointments, and provision of social and critical infrastructures. SPDC, on the other hand, demanded for re-entry, known as 'Ogoni

entry programme’. After several tedious mediation processes, it was agreed to form the following 4 committees on 11 August 1998:

- (a) Peace committee to prepare blue-print from the outcome of the mediation to form the final peace-document (i.e; reconciliation) to be signed by the principal parties and YGC at the Presidency in Abuja;
- (b) Funeral committee to arrange for proper burial of all those who died in the crisis, including, ‘Ogoni 13’;
- (c) Development committee to evolve a SD programme for the 126 towns/villages in Ogoniland; and
- (d) Relocation of the venue of the peace process from Port Harcourt City Hall to Bori, traditional headquarters of Ogoniland, in order to carry along the local population.

It should be emphasized that the perspectives and processes of each track was synthesized through several technical sessions, and the committees worked hard and submitted their reports to General Gowon on 18 April 1999. Thereafter, another 5-member committee was set up to study the different reports and prepare a final ‘consensus peace-document’ i.e; **reconciliation track**, for signing by all the parties and YGC at the Presidency in Abuja on 15 November 2001 (Table 1-7).

**Table 1-7: YGC’s Multi-Track (MT) Model of Peace-Building**



**Source:** Culled from *Peace Building Process in Ogoni land*, Yakubu Gowon Institute, Abuja, 1997-2003

It was at this point SPDC allegedly sponsored another parallel peace process facilitated by Chief G. N. K. Giniwa, *GbenemeneTua-Tua Tai* (who was also a member of YGC’s peace process), and truncated the ‘MT’ model. Thus, the OPP was not properly concluded, as General Gowon, being frustrated by the SPDC action, prepared and sent his report to the then HOSG, General Abubakar Abdulsalami (1998-1999) and closed down the Port Harcourt offices in February 2003. Be that as it may, it (OPP) made remarkable gains in several areas, especially restoration of relative peace; transformation to a large extent, the 126 towns/villages through development programmes and

projects, including appointments/employment of Ogoni sons and daughters at the state and federal levels; disbandment of the internal security taskforces; lifting of the ban on MOSOP; and lifting the federal government's 'zero allocation' policy to Khana LGA.

In sum, the MT model made major strands but was inadequate to reach the final track of **reconciliation** as there were no mechanism to detect threats to security arising from internal and external sources as the case of Chief Giniwa and SPDC. This prompted improvement on the model, and we have presented below, 'modified multi-track (MMT)' model in Table 1-8.

#### **(b) Modified Multi-Track (MMT) Model.**

The MMT model in Table 1-8 (a) has 8 tracks in order to avoid the errors of MT model (Table 1-7) that took for granted the painstaking efforts to identify the **real issues** (problems) and **clustered** them at track 1. Thereafter, it progressed to track 2 where the clustered problems were **assigned** to clustered organizations to synthesize before **communicating** the issues to the principal parties, especially, Ogoni people, SPDC and stakeholders.

In MT model, having heard from the principal parties, especially the signatories to OBR and SPDC, the facilitator (General Gowon) then converged a meeting in August 1997. In MMT model, the problems were identified from a broad spectrum of actors and properly assigned to the 3 main principal actors. This is understandable as the Ogoni crisis has been highly popularized before the YGC peace process began in 1997. Also, the peace builder (i.e; General Gowon assisted by Chief Harold Dappa-Biriye, the then Managing Director of SPDC) were of high profile. Thus, the problems have to be thoroughly identified. Unfortunately, this approach is not the case in most of the peace processes managed and/or resolved in the region (Ibaba & Etekpe, 2013; and Etekpe, *et al* 2010) even where the issues (problems) were complex and interwoven. The thoroughness in MMT model added impetus to the effectiveness of communication and collaboration in tracks 3 and 4 in Table 1-8a. Whereas in MT model, (Table 1-7), collaboration embraced **negotiation**, we have separated it in MMT model in (Table 1-8(a) (5).

In **negotiation track**, the parties bargained with each other to satisfy their interests. In OPP, there were tedious negotiations on the interests/demands/positions. The Ogoni people, as earlier stated, negotiated for the federal government to create an Ogoni state, lifting of the ban on 'zero allocation' policy to Khana LGA'; and SPDC for electrification and road network of the 126 towns/villages. SPDC, on the other hand, negotiated for its re-entry to explore/exploit oil/gas in Ogoniland. In the process, there were compromises, i.e, Ogoni people dropped the demand for a separate state, while SPDC suspended its Ogoni re-entry plan. In essence, the track 5 that was omitted has become very prominent phase in peace-building, and determinant for progression to other tracks, including mediation and arbitration.

The **arbitration** (track 7) was equally omitted in MT model. As earlier stated, where there is an effective negotiation, and the outcomes are accepted, parties should proceed to reconciliation track. We introduced arbitration here because experience has shown that often times, parties may not agree on the outcome of the facilitation, mainly due to environmental influences outside the control of the actors in the peace process. Under such circumstance, as it is rampant in the region, parties should agree to submit their case to a neutral party acting as judge, and to abide by the


decision. In other words, the decision of the arbitrator, known as, arbitration award, is binding on the parties unless it is vacated by a competent court of jurisdiction.

The other important feature in MMT model in (Table 1-8) is that the interaction during the peace building process goes back and forth (as indicated by the arrows) until the conflict is finally reconciled (resolved) as against the linear bottom-up approach from tracks 1 to 4 in Table 1-7. Experience has shown that the modification by including the additional 4 tracks (i.e; 1, 2, 5 and 7) is very essential in realizing the utmost goal of reconciliation in the conflicts that involved Okordia-Biseni Clans (2003), Peretorugbene (intra-communal) (2004), Gbarain-Ekpetiama clans (2012), etc, in the region..

The MMT model has high potential for realizing **reconciliation** [Table 1-8a (8)]. This track is where all parties to the conflict finally endorse a ‘consensus (peace) document’ with a pledge in writing to abide by the agreement. The track is, often times, accompanied by traditional oath taking by a grand ceremony. The Table 1-8 shows clearly that there is a nexus between MMT model, good governance and SD. The tracks are synthesized and processed through the mechanism of constructive dialogue, engagement, and intensive interaction in course of the peace-building process to promote good governance (Table 1-8b). This shall, in turn, stimulate outcomes that manifest as SD (Table 1-8c) that shall then engender peace in the region. Thus, the peace that follows the reconciliation process shall elicit citizens’ participation in the political, i.e., (political parties and electoral process) activities where they shall, unlike in the conflict environment, insist on adherence to the political parties internal democracy in conducting party primaries to produce credible leader(s); and hold them accountable to the application and utilization of public funds while in office, and provision of social and critical infrastructures (Table 1-8c). The nexus is important because as earlier pointed out, ‘conflict (i.e; absence of peace) is an enemy of SD’.

**Table 1-8: The MMT Model-Good Governance-Sustainable Development Nexus in Niger Delta region in Nigeria.**

**Table 1-8: The MMT Model-Good Governance-Sustainable Development Nexus in Niger Delta region in Nigeria.**



It is worth stating that we applied the MMT model to achieve reconciliation and built peace in several communities in the region, including:

- (i) Okordia-Biseni clans, Yenagoa, Bayelsa state (inter-clan) in 2003;
- (ii) Peretorugbene (intra-communal), Southern Ijaw, Bayelsa state in 2004;
- (iii) Edegeri in Enginni clan, in Ahoada West LGA, Rivers state (chieftaincy) in 2007; and
- (iv) Gbarain-Ekpetiama women vs Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State (breach of global memorandum of understanding (GMOU) in 2012.

### 3.3. Results:

The study found that:

- (i) The MMT model that is appropriate for peace-building to actualize SD in the region be adopted as it takes cognizance of the 8 tracks in harmony with other approaches and development strategies to create a more result-oriented solution.
- (ii) The Nigerian state has not actually pursued the actualization of SD in the region, in particular, and country, in general, over the years and has largely applied fire-brigade model. This is due mainly to the faulty process of recruiting political executives that do not possess the capacity to promote good governance and stimulate SD, especially as the data was clear that it is good governance that shall stimulate SD.
- (iii) There is a clear nexus between the MMT model, good governance and SD in the region. This is a new perspective as the on-going debate on peace-building and has pointed to 'peace as a catalyst of SD' in the region without stating clearly the tracks and models to adopt. By the result of this study, this notion is no longer correct because the data emphasized that peace itself cannot necessarily engender SD. Instead, peace has to promote good governance, which shall in turn, stimulate SD to manifest in form of provision of social/critical infrastructures, functional education, access to basic health care services, and quality of good life (Table 1-8c).
- (iv) Until the issue of effective leadership is addressed through adherence to political parties' internal democracy of recruiting credible political executives (leaders) during primaries, peace-building models alone shall not stimulate SD in the region. The model has to interact with other critical-success-factors in the region to produce SD.

## 4. Concluding Remarks and Recommendations

In conclusion, we have presented in this study, a modified multi-track (MMT) model of peace-building and highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of each of the 8 tracks with the proviso that although the tracks are related, there seems to be a common stimulus (i.e; credible political executives or leadership) responsible for peace-building in the Niger Delta. The issues of underdevelopment, oil spills and the destruction of aquatic lives, polluted drinking waters, unemployment and poverty have to be addressed by states and federal governments and MNOCs are function of effective political executive (leadership) to resolve in the region. This is possible where citizens of the region should demand for good governance from the political executives –

governors, state and national assembly members and chairmen of local government areas, with the same vigor as we approached the federal government through OBRs. This is important because it is good governance that shall eventually stimulate the desired SD in the region. The study also pointed out that while conflict is inherent in every community, it does not have to be violent or result in negative consequences all the time as in the case of NDR. We believe, the scenario in the region would be transformed.

In addition, the federal (and state) governments should muster the political will and courage to prosecute individuals and corporate organizations that perpetuate conflicts in communities in the region. This shall serve as deterrence to all the groups since the crux of the disputes in the Niger Delta is on indigenous ownership and control of natural resources and federal government's exclusive legislative powers. The federal government should as matter of urgency comply with the United Nations provisions on the Law of the Sea (UNLOS) on the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The UNLOS agreed to protect and guarantee the rights of all coastal states that are contiguous to the EEZ for SD (Opukri, 1999:120-130).

Based on the discussion and results, we wish to recommend:

- 1) The adoption of MMT model of peace-building in the region; and
- 2) The federal government should demonstrate political will to develop the region the same way it developed other 'swamps and deserts' like Lagos and Abuja in Nigeria.

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